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The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity
*
 
We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what co-
workers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) 
in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay 
comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to 
affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own 
effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces 
of social information systematically influences employees’ reciprocity. A generous wage offer 
is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid 
generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of 
her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort 
is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced 
when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-worker’s effort 
decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own 
wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find 
substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social 
information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important 
tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes. 
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Reciprocity can have an important influence on economic behaviour, as demonstrated in a 
wide range of experiments where many individuals forgo some of their own earnings to reward 
the generosity of others
1. Much of this evidence, however, comes from stylised social 
environments which lack important elements of naturally occurring social situations. In natural 
settings interactions between individuals are often non-anonymous and contextualised, and the 
treatment and behaviour of similar others in similar circumstances is often observable. This paper 
investigates how exposure to social comparison information about referent others (i.e. learning 
what similar others do and how they are treated) influences the extent to which individuals 
comply with norms of positive reciprocity. 
The next section discusses in detail the related literatures. We note that evidence of 
reciprocity is largely based on bilateral interactions as represented by gift-exchange, investment 
and sequential dilemma games. Naturally occurring interactions, on the other hand, take place in 
complex social environments where individuals are typically exposed to considerable amounts of 
social information about similar others. For example, in the workplace many co-workers interact 
with an employer over a period of time, and often a worker can observe the relationship between 
other workers and the employer, perhaps providing information that affects their own attitude 
towards the employer. One piece of social information that one might expect to be salient to 
workers is pay comparison information (i.e. information about what co-workers earn). In fact, 
empirical evidence, both from the lab and the field, on the effects of pay comparisons is 
decidedly mixed. A second piece of social information that is sometimes available is effort 
comparison information (i.e. information about how co-workers perform). We argue that the 
combination of both pieces of social information may have important influences on individual 
behaviour, even though the behavioural impact of pay comparison information in isolation from 
effort comparison information may be ambiguous.  
Section 3 describes our experimental design for investigating the effects of social 
comparison information. We study experimental “firms” composed of three members: an 
“Employer” and two “Employees”, labelled as “Employee 1” and “Employee 2”. The game 
                                                 
1 For a review and a discussion of the relevance of reciprocity in economics, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2002). For a general overview of the importance of reciprocity in social interactions, see Cialdini 
(2001). 
  2begins with the Employer choosing wages for each employee, which are then publicly observed. 
A key feature of the game is that the two employees then choose efforts sequentially: thus, while 
both have full information about relative wages at the time they make effort choices, only 
Employee 2, who moves last, has access to information about the co-worker’s effort. Hence, 
Employee 1’s behaviour reveals how pay comparison information in isolation from effort 
comparison information influences effort choices and reciprocity, while from Employee 2’s 
decisions we can study the effects of the concurrent availability of pay and effort comparison 
information. 
We report our results in Section 4. We find that exposure to both pieces of social comparison 
information systematically influences effort choices and affects employees’ reciprocity towards 
the employer in important ways. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is 
matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee 
tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when 
the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. 
Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this 
case co-workers’ effort decisions are disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and 
positively related to own wage. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort 
comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own 
wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. Overall, 
reciprocal responses tend to be less intense when larger amounts of social information are 
available (i.e. among Employees 2). 
These results are discussed in Section 5. Our finding that, on average, social comparison 
information undermines reciprocity is related to other recent findings which suggest that 
individuals tend to evaluate the social information available in the environment in a way beneficial 
to their self-interest. However, we also find that sometimes social information has beneficial 
effects, and we suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the 
positive effects of social comparison processes. 
2. Overview & Related Literature 
Numerous studies have shown the importance of positive reciprocity for economic 
behaviour. Using simple bilateral games such as investment (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995), 
  3sequential prisoner’s dilemma (Clark and Sefton, 2001) and gift-exchange (Fehr, Kirchsteiger 
and Riedl, 1993) games, a number of experimental studies have shown that people are willing to 
incur costs to reward kind actions, even in non-repeated and anonymous interactions where there 
are no positive future consequences associated with reciprocal behaviour. 
The gift-exchange game (GEG) reproduces a contractually incomplete labour relation 
where an “employer” makes a wage offer to an “employee” who, upon acceptance, chooses how 
much costly effort to supply. GEG experiments have been extensively used to examine the “fair 
wage-effort hypothesis” formulated in the seminal work by Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and 
Yellen (1988; 1990). According to this hypothesis labour relations can be described as reciprocal 
“gift exchange”: employees are willing to “gift” harder work effort to their employers in 
exchange for a fair wage. Consistently with the fair wage-effort hypothesis, many GEG 
experiments, including some with one-shot situations where decisions are made anonymously 
and pure self-interest would lead employees to shirk, have shown that employees systematically 
choose to reciprocate generous wage offers with higher effort (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 
1993; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Gächter, 1997; Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva, 2002; Gächter 
and Falk, 2002; Brandts and Charness, 2004; Charness, 2004; Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans, 
2007; see Gächter and Fehr, 2002, for a survey).  
Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans (2007) stress that organisations are complex social 
systems where employers typically interact with many employees at the same time, hardly 
resembling the stylised work environments studied in standard GEG experiments where 
employers bilaterally interact with single employees. Maximiano et al. conduct an experiment 
where, in their 1-4 treatment, an employer offers (the same) wage to four employees who then 
(simultaneously) choose efforts. They find that reciprocal responses are not substantially different 
from those observed in a 1-1 treatment where an employer is matched with one employee. Thus 
they find that vertical reciprocity (i.e. employer-employee gift exchange) is robust to increases in 
the size of the workforce. However, the presence of co-workers can create other differences 
between multi-worker and single-worker firms beyond the pure number effects studied by 
Maximiano et al.. In particular, in Maximiano et al. all workers are paid the same and do not 
observe each others’ behaviour, whereas in general information about what co-workers earn (pay 
comparison information) and how they perform (effort comparison information) may be 
available and may in turn influence vertical reciprocity.  
  4The relevance of pay comparison information in the workplace is suggested by abundant 
survey and case-study evidence pointing to the importance of horizontal fairness concerns (i.e. 
fairness between employees) in labour relations (e.g., Campbell III and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 
1999). Furthermore, pay comparisons constitute a central component in a number of theoretical 
approaches which build on equity theory (Adams, 1963; 1965) to improve the understanding of 
labour relations. In fact, the “fair wage” in Akerlof and Yellen’s model is defined in relative 
terms, as employees compare their own pay with their peers’ to judge how fairly they are being 
treated by the employer.  
Nevertheless, empirical support for the notion that pay comparisons systematically 
influence employees’ behaviour remains at best weak, both in the field and in the lab. Field 
studies exploring the relation between pay dispersion within an organisation and its performance 
produce mixed results: while some studies support the equity theory-driven view that internal pay 
dispersion is detrimental for work morale and job performance (e.g. Cowherd and Levine, 1992; 
Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008; Martins, 2008), others fail to find that pay dispersion has 
any effect on employees’ behaviour (e.g. Leonard, 1990; Braakman, 2008; Hunnes, 2008), and 
some studies even find that large pay differentials may have a beneficial effect on firm 
performance (e.g. Main, O’Reilly and Wade, 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller, 1999; Hibbs and Locking, 2000). The empirical evidence from laboratory 
experiments is scarce and equally inconclusive, as some experiments report negative pay 
comparison effects (Thöni, 2005; Abeler, Altmann, Kube and Wibral, 2006; Clark, Masclet and 
Villeval, 2007), while in others such effects are weak or absent (Güth, Königstein, Kovács and 
Zala-Mezõ, 2001; Charness and Kuhn, 2007).  
A possible explanation for these mixed findings is that the prominence of horizontal 
fairness considerations may crucially depend on the concurrent availability of pay and effort 
comparison information. Konow (1996, p. 22) makes the general point that “…information plays 
an important role in determining the extent to which, indeed whether, a situation will be judged 
fair or unfair…”, and in the context of multi-worker firms we believe that individuals may 
struggle to develop clear judgments of what constitutes a fair distribution of earnings when they 
know what their co-workers are paid but have incomplete information about how they perform
2. 
                                                 
2 A number of recent field studies have proposed that pay comparison processes should be studied in light of 
moderating factors, i.e. features of the organisation that 1) differ at the firm level and 2) may condition the direction 
or the strength of the behavioural responses to comparison processes (e.g. Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Brown, 
  5  Additionally, effort comparison information may have an important influence on behaviour 
per se, independently of pay comparison processes. The ability to observe how similar others 
behave in a given situation often provides valuable guidance in understanding how one is indeed 
expected to behave (see, e.g., Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990), and this in turn can shape 
behaviour. For example, Sausgruber (2006) conducts a public goods experiment in which 
members of one group can observe the contributions of another group and finds that contributions 
are positively correlated across groups. Falk and Ichino (2006) conduct a field experiment with a 
workplace task and find pairs of workers are more productive when they can observe each other 
working.  
Most closely related to the current study are two recent papers by Thöni and Gächter (2008) 
and Mittone and Ploner (2008). Thöni and Gächter design a three-person GEG with a “revision 
stage” where employees can amend initial effort decisions after learning their co-worker’s effort. 
They find that employees’ effort decisions are positively related and claim that such interactions 
can be explained by a tendency to conform to peers’ behaviour. Interestingly, while employees 
are particularly prone to reduce their effort after learning that their initial effort choice is higher 
than the co-worker’s, they increase their effort only insignificantly when they learn that the co-
worker is more hard-working. Overall, social information has a negative impact on gift exchange 
behaviour in their study, although the effect is not significant. Mittone and Ploner (2008) also 
suggest that information about peers’ behaviour may have a detrimental effect on reciprocity. 
Using a particular version of the investment game where a trustor is matched with four trustees, 
they find that learning that a peer is already transferring positive amounts to the trustor reduces 
trustees’ reciprocal responses. While the results from these studies suggest that effort comparison 
information may also have important effects in our experiment, it should be noted that both 
studies use a setting where, by design, the principal must transfer the same amount of money to 
the agents. In our experiment, on the other hand, we are able to observe effort interactions under 
different relative pay conditions, and hence can study how different combinations of pay and 
effort comparison information impact individual behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sturman and Simmering, 2003; Jirjahn and Kraft, 2007). Here we follow in part this approach and propose that the 
availability of effort comparison information may represent one of these important moderating factors. Note that 
information about co-workers’ effort may depend on features of the work environment which are likely to differ 
from firm to firm: consider, for example, the phenomenon of teleworking, (i.e. working in locations that are remote 
from centralised office), which is an emergent and fast-growing trend in labour markets (see, e.g., Hotopp, 2002; 
Ruiz and Walling, 2005). 
  63. Experimental Design & Procedures 
3.1. The experimental game 
Our aim is to set up a GEG where we can study how the combination of pay and effort 
comparison information affects employees’ reciprocal behaviour. To achieve this aim, we adapt 
the payoff structure from the experiment by Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) and modify 
the GEG used in Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998). In our experiment each firm is 
composed of three members: Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2. All players move 
sequentially in the game: the Employer moves first and chooses a wage   for each 
Employee  . The Employer can (but does not have to) choose different wages for 
different employees. Employee 1 observes both wages and then chooses an effort level 
. Employee 2 observes both wages and the effort chosen by Employee 1 and then 
chooses an effort level  . After Employee 2’s choice, the game ends and the 
Employer’s earnings are computed as: 




{ 2 , 1 ∈ i
{ 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 1 ∈ e
{ 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 2 ∈ e
( ) 2 1 2 1 10 w w e e ER − − + ⋅ = π        
and the employees’ earnings are computed as: 
( ) 1 5 − ⋅ − = i i i e w π         
for  .  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i
Our implementation of the game used the strategy method (Selten, 1967), i.e. subjects had 
to specify complete strategies in the game-theoretic sense. Participants in the role of Employee 1 
specified four effort choices, one for each wage combination that could possibly be chosen by the 
Employer. Participants in the role of Employee 2 specified sixteen effort choices, each 
corresponding to one of the information sets where they had the move.  
We implemented a one-shot version of this experimental game. The game was described to 
subjects using the same labour market frame that we use throughout the text. 
3.2. Discussion of the design 
There are a number of reasons why we use the GEG with labour market frame to address 
the questions we are interested in. First, as discussed in the previous section, positive reciprocity 
  7has been extensively documented in many GEG experiments, providing support for the relevance 
of the norm of reciprocity in these social situations. Second, also as argued earlier, individuals are 
typically exposed to considerable amounts of social information about similar others in naturally 
occurring organisations, and hence these social environments represent a suitable paradigm for 
studying how social comparisons influences behaviour. Lastly, the particular GEG we use in our 
experiment, as compared to other experimental settings, provides a cleaner environment for 
studying the “pure” effects of social comparison information on reciprocity. On this last point, 
while some environments are simply not suitable to study positive reciprocity (e.g. the dictator 
game), in others (e.g. public good games) actions of other players have a direct impact on one’s 
own monetary payoffs and hence on reciprocal considerations: thus, reactions to information 
about others’ contributions to a public good may reflect direct reciprocation (i.e., a reaction to a 
kind or unkind act by another) rather than the effect of social information per se
3. In our three-
person GEG, on the other hand, the wage the employer pays to the co-worker and the co-
worker’s effort do not directly affect an employee’s payoff and hence cannot be used to develop 
pure reciprocal considerations. 
The fully sequential structure of the game allows us to observe effort decisions in 
environments which contain different amounts of social information. Subjects in the role of 
Employee 1 make an effort decision after learning the co-worker’s wage as well as the own wage, 
but they cannot observe the co-worker’s effort. Thus, they have access to pay comparison 
information, but not effort comparison information, and their effort choices can be represented by 
an effort function  . Subjects in the role of Employee 2 are fully informed about the 
co-worker’s effort, and their effort choices can be represented by an augmented effort function 
, which describes how social information affects reciprocity when both pay and 
effort comparison information are available.  
( 2 1 1 ,w w f e = )
) , , ( 1 1 2 2 e w w g e =
The use of the strategy method allows us to observe subjects’ behaviour across all the 
information sets they control in the game. We are thus able to observe for each employee 
complete effort functions   or  () 2 1 1 ,w w f e = ) , , ( 1 1 2 2 e w w g e =  without either resorting to repeated 
play (which might induce strategic confounds and lead to unequal numbers of observations on 
different wage and/or effort combinations) or using deception. Moreover, at the time a player 
                                                 
3 Brandts and Fatàs (2004) and Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) propose experimental designs that allow to 
overcome this identification problem in voluntary contribution games.  
  8makes decisions, she is not informed of the actual decisions of any other player, and so this 
feature of the design preserves the statistical independence of each subject’s decisions vis-à-vis 
those of other subjects.  
Given that our main interest is to isolate the impact of social information on reciprocal 
behaviour, we kept the structure of the decision situation as simple as possible. In particular our 
setting involves no productivity differences or technological interdependences between 
employees
4. One could argue that the absence of productivity differences might reduce the scope 
for observing wage differences between employees, thus posing a threat to the interpretability of 
subjects’ responses to seemingly arbitrary unequal wage offers. Although productivity 
differences between employees constitute an important reason why employers may want to 
introduce pay differences between employees, there also exist other rationales for unequal wage 
offers. For example, employers may find it optimal to choose unequal wages if they are risk 
averse and uncertain about the strength of workers reciprocal preferences, or if they believe 
workers will supply high effort only if they are paid more than co-workers. 
3.3. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham between May and 
December 2007 using subjects recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had 
previously indicated their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making experiments
5. Six 
sessions were conducted with a total of 84 participants, 28 in each role. No subject took part in 
more than one session.  
Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated computer 
terminals. Subjects were given 15 minutes to read though the instructions, and then the 
experimenter read aloud a briefer précis outlining the most important points contained in the 
instructions.
6 Subjects were then randomly assigned to a group and a role. All decisions were 
made anonymously, and neither during nor after the experiment were subjects informed about the 
identity of the other members of their firm. Before proceeding to the decision stage, subjects were 
                                                 
4 The absence of technological interdependencies between employees ensures that the co-worker’s actions have no 
direct impact on an employee’s payoff. Of course, these simplifications come at a cost, as they decrease the realism 
of the decision situation and remove interesting perspectives for the study of social comparisons effects. See Güth, 
Königstein, Kovács and Zala-Mezõ (2001) and Charness and Kuhn (2007) for developments along these lines. 
5 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were 
recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
6 Experimental instructions and the précis are reproduced in Appendix A. 
  9guided through two role-specific video presentations which carefully illustrated the main features 
of the decision screens they were going to use during the experiment.
7 The first video 
presentation explained the functioning of an on-screen electronic calculator (the What-if-
calculator) that subjects could use to compute their and other players’ payoffs. At the end of the 
first video presentation, subjects were asked to solve a set of control questions and they could not 
enter the decision stage unless they had solved all the questions correctly. The second video 
presentation showed subjects how to enter their choices in a Decision Table and explained once 
again the structure of the game and the strategy method.  
On average the experimental sessions lasted about one hour, including the reading of the 
instructions and of the précis and the completion of a post-experimental questionnaire. All 
participants were endowed with an initial amount of 95 points, and earnings from the decision 
task (which could be negative) were added to this initial amount.
8 At the end of the session, the 
final point earnings were converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.10 per point. Subjects were 
paid in private and in cash at the end of each session. Subject earnings ranged from £5.10 to 
£12.70, averaging £10.30 (approximately $21 at the time of the experiment).  
4. Results 
In our experiment employers can choose from four possible wage combinations. Of the 28 
employers 6 (21%) paid high wages to both employees, 4 (14%) paid a high wage to Employee 1 
only, 3 (11%) paid a high wage to Employee 2 only, and 15 (54%) paid low wages to both. In the 
rest of this section we examine how employees reacted to the different wage combinations. We 
start by exploring whether pay comparison information affects reciprocal behaviour when 
employees can access it in isolation from effort comparison information (i.e. among Employees 
1). We then turn to Employees 2 to explore the impact on reciprocity of the simultaneous 
exposure to pay and effort comparison information. Lastly, we compare behaviour in the two 
environments. In this way, we examine our conjecture that the availability of effort comparison 
information facilitates the formation of clearer pay fairness judgments and, hence, the extent to 
                                                 
7 Video presentations were shown to subjects individually in z-Tree. Video presentations and the software are 
available upon request. 
8 Note that subjects in the role of the Employer could incur losses from the decision task. The initial endowment 
outweighed any possible losses.  
  10which individuals respond to pay comparison processes. The overall impact of different amounts 
of social information on reciprocity is also assessed. 
4.1. Social Comparisons and Reciprocity among Employees 1 
Figure 1 displays the average effort function elicited from our twenty-eight Employees 1. 
The two bars in the front row represent the wage combinations where the employee gets a low 
(16-points) own wage, while the bars at the back correspond to the two cases where the own 
wage is high (32-points). Darker bars represent wage combinations where the co-worker gets a 
low wage, while lighter bars correspond to the two cases where the co-worker is paid a high 
wage.  











An immediately apparent feature of Figure 1 is that Employees 1 tend to expend more effort 
when they are paid a high wage. Computing employees’ reciprocal responses as the change in 
own effort after an own wage rise ceteris paribus, we find that Employees 1 reciprocate higher 
wages by increasing their effort by around 0.714 when the co-worker’s wage is low and by 0.750 
when the co-worker’s wage is high
9. In both cases a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
                                                 
9 More formally, we compute Employee 1’s reciprocal responses as  ) , 16 ( ) , 32 ( 2 1 2 1 1 w w f w w f e = − = = ∆  and evaluate 
them for different values (low or high) of the co-worker’s wage.. 
  11shows that the effect is highly significant ( 503 . 3 = z 000 . 0 = p 818 . 3 = z 000 . 0  and  ,  = p ,   
respectively)
10. This pattern reproduces the robust “reciprocity result” documented in the GEG 
literature: employees reciprocate higher wages with higher effort. 
Another noticeable feature of Figure 1 is that social information has virtually no effect on 
Employee 1’s effort choices: for a given own wage, they expend roughly the same effort 
irrespective of the wage the Employer pays to the co-worker. As a result, social information does 
not affect Employee 1’s reciprocity: a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test shows that 
reciprocal responses are identical irrespective of the co-worker’s wage ( ,  048 . 0 = z 962 . 0 = p ). 
We conclude that Employees 1 reciprocate high wages with higher effort, and that pay 
comparison information has no impact on reciprocal responses. 
4.2. Social Comparisons and Reciprocity among Employees 2 
We now turn our attention to Employees 2, who were simultaneously exposed to pay and 
effort comparison information. Figure 2 shows Employee 2’s average effort function and is 
analogous to Figure 1 above, with the difference that we can now explicitly control (on the 
horizontal axis) for different levels of the co-worker’s effort.  
Figure 2: Average Effort Function of Employees 2 
1 2 3 4






  co-worker's effort 
own wage
co-worker's wage = 16 co-worker's wage = 32
 
                                                 
10 All tests are two-sided unless noted otherwise. 
  12As with Employees 1, Employees 2 also tend to increase their effort when they are paid 
higher wages. Ignoring for a moment the effects of social information and averaging across 
contingencies where the own wage is the same (i.e. across rows in Figure 2), we note that 
Employee 2’s effort increases on average by about 0.495 and the effect is highly significant 
( ,  ). In fact, for each combination of co-worker wage and co-worker effort 
level, the mean reciprocal response of Employee 2 differs from zero at the 5.8% significance 
level or lower
535 . 3 = z 000 . 0 = p
11. 
However, while reciprocity is apparent across all cases, its magnitude varies considerably 
with social information. Table 1 reports the magnitude of Employee 2’s average reciprocal 
responses for the various co-worker’s wage and effort combinations.  
Table 1: Social Comparison Information and Employee 2’s Reciprocal Response 










pairs signed-rank test 
when the co-worker’s effort is 1  0.571 
(0.790) 
0.214 
(0.568)  446 . 2 = z ,   014 . 0 = p
when the co-worker’s effort is 2  0.536 
(0.838) 
0.321 
(0.612)  146 . 1 = z ,   252 . 0 = p
when the co-worker’s effort is 3  0.607 
(0.875) 
0.464 
(0.793)  670 . 0 = z ,   503 . 0 = p
when the co-worker’s effort is 4  0.393 
(0.916) 
0.857 
(1.044)  869 . 2 = z ,   004 . 0 = p
Employee 2’s reciprocal response is computed as  ) , , 16 ( ) , , 32 ( 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 e w w g e w w g e = − = = ∆  and evaluated for 
different values of the co-worker’s wage and effort. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Two observations emerge from Table 1. First, for given levels of the co-worker’s effort, the 
magnitude of Employee 2’s reciprocal responses crucially depends on relative pay conditions. 
When an employee’s co-worker is particularly lazy (i.e. chooses minimum effort), generous wage 
offers trigger stronger reciprocity from the employee if the co-worker is paid a low wage. In fact, 
Table 1 reveals that increasing the wage of a lazy co-worker more than halves Employee 2’s 
                                                 
11 The p-values range from 0.058 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and supplies minimal effort to 
0.000 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and supplies maximal effort. 
  13average reciprocal response, which drops from 0.571 to 0.214 ( 014 . 0 = p
004 . 0
). However, in the 
presence of a particularly hard-working co-worker who chooses maximum effort, an own wage 
rise triggers higher effort when the co-worker’s wage is also increased. In fact, the intensity of 
reciprocity more than doubles (from 0.393 to 0.857,  = p ) when the Employer increases the 
wage of a hard-working co-worker. When the co-worker expends intermediate effort levels (2 or 
3 units) differences in reciprocity are weaker and not statistically significant. Hence, when 
combined with information about the co-worker’s effort, pay comparison information does have 
important implications for what employees perceive to be the appropriate reciprocal response to 
the wage they are offered. 
Second, Table 1 suggests that effort comparison information affects Employee 2’s 
reciprocal responses, but that the way in which it does so depends on relative pay conditions. 
When the co-worker’s wage is low, there is no clear relation between Employee 2’s reciprocal 
response and the co-worker’s effort choice. By contrast, when the Employer pays a high wage to 
the co-worker, Employees 2 strongly increase their effort response as the co-workers expend 
higher effort. The size of the effect is noteworthy: Employee 2’s reciprocal response increases by 
a factor of four when the co-worker chooses maximum rather than minimum effort. 
We examined these patterns in Employee 2’s effort decisions using the regression model 
ε α α α α + + + + = ) * ( ) ( ) ( 1 3 1 2 1 0 2 e wage high e wage high e  
where the explanatory variable “ ” is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 
when the own wage is high and 0 otherwise. Note that this models   as a linear function of  , 
where the slope coefficient is 
wage high
2 e 1 e
2 α  (when own wage is low) or  3 2 α α +  (when own wage is high). 
We used OLS to estimate separate models for the cases where the co-worker’s wage is low or 
high and report the results in Table 2.  
In both models the estimate of  2 α  (the coefficient on  ) is very close to, and not 
significantly different from, zero, showing that no relation between employees’ effort exists when 
the Employer pays a low wage to Employee 2. Thus, the divergent patterns observed in Table 1 
must be driven by differences in the effort chosen by Employees 2 when they get a high wage. 
When the co-worker is paid a low wage the estimate of 
1 e
3 2 α α +  is negative. This reflects the 
decline in effort that is apparent in Figure 2 (bars corresponding to own wage = 32, co-worker’s 
  14wage = 16). However, the estimate is low and not significantly different from zero 
( ;  ). In contrast, when the co-worker is paid a high wage the estimate of  7 3 . 0 ) 27 , 1 ( = F 401 . 0 = p
3 2 α α +  is positive and statistically significant ( 24 . 7 ) 27 , 1 ( = F ;  012 . 0 = p ). Thus, when the 
Employer pays a high wage to both workers, Employees 2 systematically increase their effort 
when the co-worker also does so. As we have already seen in Table 1, the impact of this effect on 
reciprocal responses is remarkable. When the co-worker receives a high wage reciprocity is 
minimal when the co-worker chooses minimal effort, but gets more intense as the co-worker 
expends higher effort and is substantial when the co-worker’s effort is maximal. 
Table 2: Employee 2’s Effort Regressions 
 
co-worker’s wage is LOW  co-worker’s wage is HIGH 




















N.   224  224 
F-statistic  F(3,27) = 5.48  F(3,27) = 6.69 
Prob > F  0.004  0.002 
R
2: 0.110  0.134 
Dependent variable is Employee 2’s effort. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for 
intragroup correlation (subjects are used as independent clustering units).  
**  ; ***  .  05 . 01 . ≤ < p 01 . ≤ p
Overall, these findings show that Employees 2 do reciprocate the Employer’s wage offer, 
but social comparisons shapes in important ways the intensity of their reciprocal response. This 
result contrasts with what we have observed among Employees 1, suggesting that the availability 
of information about the co-worker’s effort is a crucial piece of social information in our setting. 
4.3. Amounts of Social Comparison Information and Reciprocity 
As we have just seen, the concurrent availability of pay and effort comparison information 
has an important influence on reciprocity while the impact of pay comparison information in 
isolation is negligible. In the following we elaborate on this contrast and directly compare the 
behaviour of Employees 1 and 2 to explore: 1) explanations for these different behavioural 
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reciprocity. 
A possible explanation for why pay comparison information only affects behaviour when 
combined with effort comparison information is that information about the co-worker’s 
“performance type” (lazy or hard-working) plays a central role in determining the prominence of 
horizontal fairness considerations. The additional information on the co-worker’s effort choice 
may be necessary for the formation of clear and compelling pay fairness judgments and, hence, 
may increase the extent to which individuals attend to information about relative pay conditions.  
A look at individual level data supports this interpretation: pay comparison information 
affects employees’ reciprocity more heterogeneously when effort comparison information is not 
available. Out of our 56 employees, 32 (57%) are “non-selfish” (i.e., make at least one non-
minimal effort choice). Figure 3 restricts attention to these employees, 16 in each role. The figure 
shows the distribution of changes in reciprocal responses after an increase in the co-worker’s 
wage, ceteris paribus.  
Figure 3(a) shows the distribution of changes in reciprocal responses among Employees 1. 
While about 62% of subjects did not change the intensity of their reciprocity between the case 
where the co-worker gets a low wage and the case where she gets a high wage, the remaining 
subjects are equally divided among those who strengthened or weakened reciprocal responses. 
Thus pure pay comparison information can cause a variety of responses.  
Figures 3(b) and 3(c) show the distributions of changes in reciprocal responses among 
Employees 2 for the cases where the co-worker expends either minimum or maximum effort 
(where we detected significant pay comparison effects). Reactions to an increase in the co-
worker’s wage are more uniform among Employees 2: when the co-worker is lazy - Figure 3(b) - 
Employees 2 either did not react to an increase in the co-worker’s wage or unanimously reacted 
negatively by weakening their reciprocal response. By contrast, a predominant share of 
Employees 2 (75%) accepted favourably that a hard-working co-worker gets a pay rise - Figure 
3(c) - and increased the intensity of their reciprocity. 
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Changes in reciprocal responses are computed as 
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  17A second interesting question is whether being exposed to different amounts of social 
comparison information has an overall effect on the reciprocity observed among Employees 1 
and Employees 2. To explore this issue, we compare how strongly Employees 1 and Employees 2 
respond to increases in the own wage, controlling for relative pay conditions. Figure 4 shows the 
effort expended on average by non-selfish Employees 1 (n=16, plain bars) and Employees 2 
(n=16, striped bars) in the four wage combinations possibly chosen by the Employer
12.  











Employees 1 appear to be systematically more responsive to own wage increases and 
reward the Employer’s generosity with higher effort than Employees 2, irrespective of the co-
worker’s wage. To assess whether the observed differences are significant, we estimate with OLS 




() ( - ' )
(1 ) (1 * )
own effort high wage co worker s wage





   
where “employee 1” is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the subject’s role was “Employee 1”.  
The coefficient  4 α  turns out to be positive and marginally significant ( ;  98 . 1 = t 057 . 0 = p ) 
suggesting that the own effort response to an increase in the own wage is stronger among 
Employees 1 than Employees 2. Furthermore, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that 
                                                 
12 An Employee 2’s average effort in each wage combination is simply the average effort choice across the four co-
worker’s effort contingencies. 
13 We allow for correlated error terms within subjects by clustering on individuals. 
  180 4 3 = +α α  ( ;  ) showing that Employees 1 expend significantly more 
effort than Employees 2 when the own wage is high. 
15 . 5 ) 31 , 1 ( = F 030 . 0 = p
These results show that reciprocity towards the employer is significantly weaker when 
employees are exposed to both pay and effort comparison information than is the case when only 
pay comparison information is available.  
5. Discussion & Conclusions 
We have designed an experimental situation to study reciprocal behaviour in an 
environment where subjects can observe the treatment and behaviour of similar others before 
deciding on their reciprocal response. We argue that exposure to these pieces of social 
information is typical in naturally occurring social environments (e.g. in the workplace) and 
hence we believe that studying behaviour in such a setting can add in important ways to the 
understanding of individual decisions in social situations.  
Focusing on the study of behaviour in the workplace, we have found that the extent to which 
individuals comply with norms of reciprocity is significantly affected by two pieces of social 
information: pay and effort comparison information. We find that reciprocity towards employers is 
weakest when lazy co-workers are paid generously. In such circumstances the prominence of the 
norm of reciprocity appears to be substantially eroded by the influence of competing behavioural 
tendencies, such as horizontal fairness concerns (i.e. “keeping up” with the equally well paid co-
worker) and a preference to conform to a peer’s behaviour. This result suggests that social 
comparisons may have detrimental effects on reciprocal relations. By contrast, the very same 
motivations which induce employees to disregard generous own wage offers in some 
circumstances may end up amplifying reciprocal responses in others. We find that high wage 
offers trigger substantial reciprocity from an employee if she is matched with a well paid and hard-
working co-worker: under such circumstances effort responses are four times stronger than when 
the well paid co-worker is lazy and twice as intense as compared to the case where the co-worker 
is hard-working but receives a lower wage. Reciprocity appears to be less sensitive to social 
information when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case effort choices 
are strongly related to own wage offers and do not depend significantly on the effort expended by 
the co-worker. Lastly, we find that exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from 
effort comparison information does not have significant effects on reciprocal behaviour. In this 
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suggests that the availability of information about the co-worker’s type (lazy or hard-working) 
may be crucial in determining the extent by which individuals attend and respond to horizontal 
fairness concerns
14. Consistent with our conjectures, we find evidence that this may be due to the 
fact that in the absence of effort comparison information individuals may struggle to form clear 
and uniform pay fairness judgments.  
These findings are in line with those of several other recent studies that suggest that social 
information can systematically affect behaviour in a variety of settings. For example, a number of 
dictator game experiments have shown that dictators tend to behave more (less) generously 
towards recipients when they are informed about generous (selfish) choices made by other 
participants (Cason and Mui, 1998; Krupka and Weber, 2007; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2008). 
Analogous evidence on the importance of social information comes from ultimatum game (Knez 
and Camerer, 1995; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) and public goods game experiments 
(Carpenter, 2004; Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005)
15.  
What is the general impact of social comparisons on reciprocity? The overall patterns that 
emerge from our data suggest that reciprocal behaviour tends to be less pronounced in more 
complex social environments (i.e. where there are larger amounts of social information): on 
average Employee 2’s reciprocal responses are less intense that Employee 1’s. Such results 
appear in line with the recent findings by Mittone and Ploner (2008) and Thöni and Gächter 
(2008), which also report an overall negative impact of social information on reciprocal 
behaviour in related experimental settings. One explanation for these findings could be that 
individuals tend to use the social information available in the environment in a way beneficial to 
their self-interest. Indeed, other studies have argued that when the informational structure of a 
social situation leaves room for ambiguity about appropriate behaviour, or makes different and 
perhaps competing norms of conduct salient, individuals tend to comply with the behavioural 
motivation that best suits their own self-interest (e.g. Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007; Xiao and 
                                                 
14 This interpretation is consistent with the point made by Greenberg, Ashton-James and Ashkanasy (2007), who 
stress that the existence of constraints on the availability of pieces of social information may have important 
consequences for the very nature of comparison processes. Conner (2003), for example, claims that in the lack of 
workers physical proximity individuals may cope with the scarcity of comparison information about their co-workers 
by changing the comparison referent (e.g. oneself in the past or similar others outside of the organisation), by relying 
more on dissimilar comparisons, or by substituting person-based comparisons (i.e. comparisons between oneself and 
other individuals) with system comparisons (e.g. comparisons between the organisations one has worked for). 
15 On the other hand, Brandts and Fatás (2004) cannot find any significant impact of social information on behaviour 
in a two-person public goods game. 
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16. In our setting, Employees 2 face a relatively complex social environment 
where a number of relevant motivational forces are salient. In some cases these motivational 
tendencies pull in different directions: consider the case of an employee receiving a high wage 
and observing the equally well-paid co-worker expending little effort. Vertical reciprocity would 
require that the employee expends high effort to repay the employer’s generous wage offer. 
Nevertheless the employee may dislike earning less than the co-worker and hence may prefer to 
reduce her reciprocal response in order not to “fall behind”. Conformism considerations may also 
induce the employee to match the co-worker’s low effort. What should one do in the face of such 
competing norms of behaviour? Under such circumstances our subjects tended to disregard 
vertical reciprocity and choose low effort, a choice which is also payoff-maximising. Although 
social information can also have a positive effect on reciprocity in some circumstances – e.g., 
when the different behavioural motivations are less discordant – in our experiment this positive 
impact of social information was outweighed by the negative effects which occur when social 
information introduces competing norms of behaviour. 
Nevertheless, our finding that there exist circumstances where social comparisons have 
beneficial effects on reciprocity points to the importance of devising mechanisms that can reshape 
the social environment such that social information may end up fostering reciprocal behaviour. 
We propose that selective group composition may be one such mechanism. We see considerable 
heterogeneity across players: some appear reciprocally motivated whereas others choose 
uniformly low effort. An employer choosing employees should avoid low effort providers for two 
reasons. First, such employees cannot be motivated to supply high levels of effort, since they 
respond to high wages by shirking. Second, as we have stressed, they also undermine the 
employer’s ability to induce gift exchange from reciprocally motivated employees. In fact, social 
information within heterogeneous groups tends to undermine performance, as observation of 
shirkers tends to induce “team players” to adopt more selfish behaviours
17. Similarly, employers 
should find reciprocally motivated employees attractive for two reasons. First, they can be 
motivated to supply high levels of effort, and second, they induce higher levels of reciprocity 
                                                 
16 Other related studies also point to the existence of a self-serving or egocentric bias when one’s self-interest is at 
stake. See Konow (2005) for an overview and related literature. For an exploration of this phenomenon in the 
workplace, see Charness and Haruvy (2000). 
17 A similar process has been observed in public goods experiments, where it has also been suggested that selective 
group composition may foster cooperation, see for example Burlando and Guala (2005) and Gächter and Thöni 
(2005). 
  21from other employees. Thus homogeneous groups of reciprocally motivated employees may 
provide the best environment for harnessing the positive effects of social comparisons. This 
argument is complementary to those made by the business executives interviewed by Bewley 
(1999): in their view layoffs do less damage to work morale and performance than pay cuts, 
because layoffs “get the misery out the door” while pushing the remaining workers to work 
harder in order to avoid future dismissal, whereas pay cuts have a negative impact on all workers’ 
motivation. In addition, our results suggest that if layoffs target less productive workers this has 
the further advantage of reducing the heterogeneity of the workforce thus strengthening the effort 
responses of reciprocally motivated employees. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions and Précis 
Instructions 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment on decision-making that has been financed by various 
foundations for research promotion. 
 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn a considerable amount 
of money. It is therefore very important to read these instructions with care. 
 
During this experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants in any way. If you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your desk. If you violate this rule, you 
will be excluded from the experiment and from all payments. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. You will receive an initial endowment of 95 points, 
which will be enough to cover any loss that might occur during the experiment. The points you lose will be 
subtracted from your endowment.  
At the end of the experiment we will convert your point earnings into money at the following rate: 
1 Point = 10 Pence 
Your total money earnings will be paid out to you in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this experiment you will be randomly matched with two other participants to form a group of three persons. We 
will refer to each group as a firm, and to the three group members as Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2. 
You will be assigned to a firm and a role entirely at random, and the computer will inform you of your role before 
the decision-making part of the experiment begins. You will not be informed about who of the other participants are 
in your firm, either during or after the experiment. Therefore, all decisions are made anonymously. 
2. Decisions within a Firm  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
9  First, the Employer chooses the wages to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and Employee 2 (Wage2). The 
Employer can choose between two wage levels, 16 or 32. If he or she wants to, the Employer can choose 
different wages for different Employees.  
9  Next, Employee 1 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee, and then chooses an effort level 
(Effort1), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
9  Finally, Employee 2 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee, and also the effort decision of 
Employee 1. Employee 2 then chooses an effort level (Effort2), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
3. Distribution of earnings within a Firm 
Earnings within the Firm are determined according to the following rules: 
 
Employer 
The Employer receives revenue from the effort chosen by the two Employees, and incurs costs from the wages paid 
to the two Employees. The revenue produced by each Employee equals 10 times the effort he or she chooses. The 
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costs are simply the sum of the two wages the Employer pays to the Employees. The Employer’s earnings are 
therefore: 
 
Employer’s Earnings = 10 * (Effort1 + Effort2) – Wage1 – Wage2
 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels. The higher the wages the Employer pays to the two 
Employees, the lower are the Employer’s earnings. Note that the Employer’s earnings could be negative. 
Employee 1 
Employee 1 receives the wage from the Employer as revenue, and may incur an effort cost. The minimum effort 
choice of 1 is costless. Each additional unit of effort costs 5 points to the Employee. Therefore the effort cost is 
calculated as: 5 * (Effort – 1). The earnings of Employee 1 are therefore: 
 
Employee 1’s Earnings = Wage1 – 5 * (Effort1 – 1) 
 
The earnings of Employee 1 only depend on his or her own wage and effort. The higher the wage, the higher are the 
earnings. The higher the effort he or she chooses, the lower are the earnings. 
Employee 2 
The earnings of Employee 2 are calculated in the same way as those of Employee 1, except, of course, that Employee 
2’s earnings depend on his or her own wage (Wage2) and his or her own effort choice (Effort2): 
 
Employee 2’s Earnings = Wage2 – 5 * (Effort2 – 1) 
 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES 
 
Assume that the Employer chooses the following wages for his or her Employees: 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 1 = 32 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 2 = 16 
The Employees choose the following effort: 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 1 = 2 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 2 = 3 
This situation results in the following earnings: 
 
EMPLOYER’S EARNINGS: The Employer receives revenue from the effort of the two Employees, i.e.: 10*(2 + 
3) = 50. The Employer pays a total of 48 points to the Employees. 
The earnings of the Employer are: 50 – 48 = 2. 
 
EMPLOYEE 1’S EARNINGS: Employee 1 receives a wage of 32. The effort choice of 2 has a cost of 5*(2 – 1) 
= 5. 
The earnings of Employee 1 are: 32 – 5 = 27. 
 
EMPLOYEE 2’S EARNINGS: Employee 2 receives a wage of 16. The effort choice of 3 has a cost of 5*(3 – 1) 
= 10. 
The earnings of Employee 2 are: 16 – 10 = 6. 
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4. The Decision Task 
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one described above, in this experiment we ask 
you to take a decision for each possible situation that may arise. Please note that one of these situations will be 
actually relevant, so make your choices carefully. 
The situations you face when making your decisions will depend on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee within the Firm. The Employer can 
choose between: 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 32; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 32. 
Depending on the choice of the Employer one of four situations will arise: 
o  Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 16; 
o  Employee 1 could have a wage of 16 while Employee 2 has a wage of 32; 
o  Employee 1 could have a wage of 32 while Employee 2 has a wage of 16; 
o  Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 32. 
If you are Employee 1 you will be in one of these four situations. However, before knowing which of these 
situations you are actually in, you will be asked to indicate what you would do for each of the four possible 
situations you may be in. You will see a decision screen like the one below: 
 
Each box represents one of the four possible situations you may be in. In each of these boxes, you must enter an 
effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your actual effort choice will depend on which of these four possible situations will 
actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the Employer. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen situations may arise:  
o  Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of effort; 
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o  Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 chooses 2 units of effort; 
o  ….and so on. 
If you are Employee 2 you will be in one of these sixteen situations. However, before knowing which of these 
situations you are actually in, you will be asked to indicate what you would do for each of the sixteen possible 
situations you may be in. You will see a decision screen like the one below: 
 
Each box represents one of the sixteen possible situations you may be in. In each of these boxes, you must enter 
an effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your actual effort choice will depend on which of these sixteen possible 
situations will actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the Employer and on the effort 
actually chosen by Employee 1. 
 
More information about how to solve your specific Decision task will be provided to you via computer later on 
during the experiment, once your role has been determined. 
 
You have to perform this task only once. 
 
5. How do we determine your actual earnings? 
Although Employee 1 will take four effort decisions, only one will be relevant in determining the earnings of 
members of the Firm. Similarly, only one of the sixteen effort decisions made by Employee 2 will be actually used in 
the earnings’ computation. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of the experiment, once everyone in the firm has 
taken his or her decisions: the actual wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four 
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possible situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1’s choice in this relevant situation will determine which of 
the sixteen possible situations is relevant for Employee 2. 
 
 
6. What happens next? 
I.  When the experiment starts you will be informed about whether you are an Employer or an Employee in this 
experiment. In case you are an Employee, it will be specified whether you are Employee 1 or Employee 2.  
II.  When you press the “Continue” button, a screen with a brief video-presentation about the main features of the 
experiment will appear. In this video-presentation you will receive some information about the “What-if-
calculator”, a tool you can use during the experiment to facilitate your computations. It is important to note 
that no other participant will be informed about your calculations and that these calculations do not have any 
effect on your earnings. 
III.  After this brief video-presentation, you will access a new screen where you will be asked to answer a few 
questions. You will have to calculate the earnings of all members of your Firm for five hypothetical scenarios, 
with the help of the “What-if-calculator”. Press “Check” when you have answered all the questions. You will 
be informed about whether your answers are correct. 
IV.  Once you have answered all the questions correctly, you will be guided to a new short video-presentation that 
will give you specific information about how to enter your decisions into the Decision Table. 
V.  After that, you will finally enter the Decision Task screen. Depending on whether you are an Employer or an 
Employee you will have to choose wages or effort levels. In this screen, you will again have the possibility to 
use the “What-if-calculator”. 





I will now briefly summarize the content of the instructions you have just read. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with two other participants to form a group of 
three people and you will be randomly assigned a role within this group, which we will call “firm”. You will be 
either the Employer or Employee 1 or Employee 2.  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
First, the Employer chooses one wage to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and one wage to pay to Employee 2 (Wage2).  
Next, Employee 1 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee, and then chooses an effort level (Effort1). 
Finally, Employee 2 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee and also the effort decision of Employee 
1, and then chooses an effort level (Effort2). 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels and decrease with higher wages. 
The Employees’ earnings increase in the wage they receive and decrease with higher effort. The earnings of each 
Employee only depend on his or her own wage and effort.  
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one I have just described, in this 
experiment we ask you to take a decision for each possible situation that may arise. This is a crucial point, so 
make sure you have understood it correctly. 
The possible situations you will face when making your decisions will depend on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee within the Firm. Thus, depending on 
the choice of the Employer one of four situations will arise: 
o  Both Employees could get a wage of 16; 
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o  Both Employees could get a wage of 32; 
o  And the two situations where one Employee gets a wage of 16 while the other Employee gets a wage of 32; 
 
If you are Employee 1 you must indicate an effort choice for each of these four possible situations, before knowing 
which one you are actually in. Remember, one of these four decisions will be the one that is actually relevant, so 
make your choice carefully. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen situations may arise:  
o  Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of effort 
o  Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 2 units of effort; 
o  ….and so on…  
Since there are 4 possible levels of effort and 4 possible wage combinations, 16 situations in all may arise. 
If you are Employee 2 you must indicate an effort choice for each of the sixteen possible situations. Remember, one 
of these sixteen decisions will be the one that is actually relevant, so make your choice carefully. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of the experiment, once everyone in the firm has 
taken his or her decisions: the actual wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four 
possible situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1’s choice in this relevant situation will determine which of 
the sixteen possible situations is relevant for Employee 2. 
 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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